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BOOK REVIEWS
Book Reviews
THE GREAT CRASH, 1929, -by John K. Galbraith. Boston, Houghton
Mifflin, 1955, 212 pages, $3.00.
No one would deny that lawyers or at least the successful ones, need a
pretty extensive knowledge of "investments" in order adequately to serve
,their clients. This means a knowledge of stocks and the stock market.
Some lawyers know nothing at all about either. Some have a "working
knowledge," which is the same thing. A few are good, which probably
explains in large part why they have the most extensive of trusts and estates
practices. To see the need, and I suspect, also some of the lack of fulfill-
ment, one need only read the chapters on "Investments," ".Prudent Man
Rule," 'legal Lists," etc., in such standard works as Shattuck's An Estate
Planner's Handbook and Stephenson's Drafting Wills & Trust Agreements
Administrative Provisions.
The Great Crash will not give any lawyer an education in stocks and
the stock market. But it is a grand little book, written in the best of literary
styles, which goes a long way toward helping one understand the way in
which the system is supposed to work and some of the reasons why and
how investors and the public en masse occasionally keep it from working
that way. For the law student I would venture that a careful reading of
this book together with Judge Medina's opinion in the investment banking
anti-trust case, U.S. v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp, 621 (1953), and perhaps Judge
Shientag's opinion in Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 667 (1940), would
provide an excellent start towards an understanding of how the system
works for bringing about financial intercourse between people who have
inventive ideas and those who have capital.
It is not a scholarly treatise; it is not an analytical study of forces eco-
nomic. It is a well-written account of what happened to a great economy
in an incredibly short time. From its opening sentence, "Some years, like
some poets and politicians and some lovely women, are singled out for
fame far beyond the common lot, and 1929 was clearly such a year," the
reader is absorbed in an economic tale that is well worth telling. But it is
economics of a different sort from what most of us as former students in
college survey courses have come to expect of economists. There isn't, as I
recall, a single graph, nor a single chart, nor even many statistics. Such a
format was chosen, I suppose, because Mr. Galbraith elected to write about
what happened when the end came, how we knew it was an end, how it
happened and, most importantly, how long it took us to know, first, that it
was the end and, second, how ragged the break would be.
The Great Crash is at its core the story of seven days which occurred
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during a span of two months. For eighteen months or so prior to these
fateful seven days, a relatively small segment of the American public had
been on a speculative orgy. Perhaps the most absurd performance of all
was that of "Radio" which rose to nearly 500 without ever in its history
having paid a single dividend. A few sages of "the street" thought the
country might run out of common stocks. However, this danger was
avoided, in part at least by the development of the investment trust. In-
cidentally, the brokers and the investing public reached truly heroic mad-
ness in the use of these trusts - at least one set of incestuously investing
investment trusts (sponsored of course by what was then and is now one
of the most respectable and respected houses) issued a quarter of a billion
dollars worth of securities in less than a month. By 1929 every city, most
towns and even a few hamlets began to think that they too should have
stock markets. Truly, it seemed that the whole country was common stock
oriented although only one and one-half million people were actually in-
vesting and of these only six hundred thousand were "on margin," that is
to say, real speculators.
Then came the seven fateful days, September 5 and October 19, 21, 23,
24, 28 and 29, 1929. They brought to the United States a truly ghastly ex-
perience for they were the days of the greatest of all stock market col-
lapses. The most remembered of all seven days, October 24, we all know
as "Black Thursday." But the following Tuesday, October 29, was by far
the most devastating day in the entire 138 year history of the New York
Stock market. 16A million shares were traded on that one day (before
1929 for many years the dream and goal had been to see a 5 million share
day and on July 8, 1932, only 700,000 shares were traded), the Times In-
dustrial Average slid a whopping 43 points, and the investment trusts were
wrung dry.
But the collapse was by no means the end. It was only the beginning,
for with even the blue chip stocks now in the bargain class many people
stepped up to what they thought was the basement counter of early No-
vember, 1929, to make fortunes out of the scattered little pieces of other
people's fortunes. Instead, from October 30, a day of miraculous recovery,
until June of 1930 there was a steady succession of climax and anticlimax,
each week seeing new bargain seekers picking up the pieces of last week's
bargain seekers now gone through the wringer. June of 1930 saw the be-
ginning of a solid two years of steady, sickening decline.
For those of us who are adult and yet too young to remember with the
vividness that could come only from having been "caught in the market,"
the facts and figures are astounding. Indeed, part of Mr. Galbraith's de-
clared purpose is to help burn the memory a little deeper in the public
consciousness on the theory (which he shares with many) that the mere
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memory of the crash is a strong deterrent to the speculation which bred it.
Between September 3, 1929, "the end of the 1920's bull market" and July
of 1932, the nadir of the collapse, the Times Industrial Average plummeted
from 452 to 58, US. Steel from 262 down to 22, General Motors from 73
to 8, American Telephone and Telegraph from 304 to 72 and Montgomery
Ward -from 138 to 4.
I doubt that anyone will agree with Mr. G-abraith when he suggests,
referring to the fantastic boom in the summer of 1929, "Perhaps it was
worth being poor for a long time to be so rich for just a little while." It was
a period which the delightful euphemisms of brokerese would call some-
thing on the order of "a period characterized by a generally downward trend
in price movements in the main body of stocks although selected issues in-
termittently displayed the characteristics of a major recovery temporarily
forestalled for technical readjustment." Translation: times were tough and
getting tougher!
There is neither need nor room for summarizing here Mr. Galbraith's
main themes of cause and effect. For the most part they seem standard.
Unhappily, however, there is also no room for summarizing his underlying
Veblenesque minor themes of the system, the "no business" meeting, the
U.S. ritual for "reality by affirmance," particularly by persons in high places
(Mr. Galbraith also calls it "faith in the efficiency of incantation"), the
perhaps uniquely American faith in men who are "in on things," the art -
particularly in the field of public administration - of "stimulating action
when action is impossible" and the faith in "pronouncements stamped with
authority," particularly financial authority. These, sprinkled throughout
the book, perhaps a little too freely, must be left for the reader's own palate.
There are numerous discussions which will be of special interest to the
lawyer. For the lawyer interested in criminal law, particularly crimes of
first-offenders, the're is an interesting discussion in Chapter VIII of the
rise and fall of the embezzlement rate and of the discovery of such pecula-
tions (Mr. Galbraith refers to the money taken as the "bezzle") with the
rise and fall of th& business cycle. It seems that the crime rate increases
during a boom while the rate of discovery is decreasing, and the crime rate
decreases during a depression while the rate of discovery increases. The
property liw'teacher, at least if he is a Hohfeldian, will be equally interested
in the discussion in Chapter II of the "binder" used during the Florida real
estate boom, and the margin system of stock investment, which, particularly
during the summer of 1929, contributed greatly to the maddened rise of the
stock market. Both of these devices, according to Mr. Galbraith, were
designed primarily to separate from all other aspects of property ownership,
the prospect for an early rise in market value, thereby permitting the specu-
lators to speculate (read: gamble?) with the least amount of fuss and bother
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inherent in the responsibilities of full ownership. As a matter of fact, the
margin system does the binder system one better, for the speculator also
gets the current dividend income of the stocks he has purchased on margin.
In conclusion, I am left with one great area of wonderment. Some
people say today "beware lest it happen again"; some talk, which Mr. Gal-
braith assures us was characteristic of 1928 and early 1929 seems to be
appearing again. The National City Bank of New York (one of that most
revered of all types of economic institutions) in its Monthy Letter for No-
vember, 1955, quotes from a speech of Dr. Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers (a position of high authority, particularly
sounding of being "in on things" financial) as aptly describing the situa-
tion in saying "In an economy like ours, poised on a high plateau, neither
the threat of inflation nor of recession can ever be very distant." (Certainly
Mr. Galbraith would call this "incantation" or perhaps "reality by affirm-
ance"). My wonderment: what does the non-speculating investor do with
his money to keep from being crushed along with the speculators when
the indices enter "a generally downward trend" from, say 450 to 50? It
could happen. It did, you know.
D. C. OSMOND*
NiNE MEN. A political history of the Supreme Court from 1790 to
1955, by Fred Rodell, New York, Random House, 1955, 338 pages, $5.00.
Fred Rodell, professor of law at Yale University,,has recently completed
a short history of the Supreme Court. He set for himself a difficult task:
that of compressing the court's 165 year history into 300-odd pages. He has
done an admirable job in his distinctive and pungent journalistic style.
Mr. Rodell is the author of many articles and several books in and about
the law. Most of his writings have been directed at the every-day reader
and not at his fellow legal technicians. The present volume is likewise
aimed at the larger group of readers, but it may well cause more of a stir
among lawyers and students of the law.
Although his style and phraseology might seem to indicate it, Mr. Rodell
is not merely a popularizer. He knows the technical ins and outs of the
law and the courts, and he has a carefully considered position in regard to
his subject. If Mr. Rodell's philosophy of law can be categorized, I suppose
it would come under the "legal realist" heading. His present-day Supreme
Court heroes are Justices Black and Douglas. In his political outlook, Mr.
* Mr. Osmond is a practicing attorney in Cleveland, Ohio and was formerly a mem-
ber of the faculty at the Harvard Law School.
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